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Introduction
This chapter e.xplores the contestation between management and NUMSA over the transition from 
the apartheid workplace regime Both the nature of the transition and its goals were the subject of 
contestation; the two parties had profoundly different conceptions of both the desirable outcomes of 
the transition and how to achieve them. The union sought a radical democratisation of the workplace 
and the company with the aims of replacing the apartheid workplace regime with a workplace regime 
that enhanced workers'control and skills, established co-determination of production and company 
development, and simultaneously improved the company's competitiveness in global markets. The 
vision of the shopstewards is described in chapter 11
In contrast, management was determined to retain control, both over the period of transition, and 
within a new post-apartheid workplace regime. Unlike the union, management did not have a clearly 
formulated or coherent strategy, either for reforming the apartheid workplace regime or for meeting 
the challenge of intensified global competitiveness. Indeed, its efforts at change appeared to be 
marked by confusion, inconsistency and internal division. Its overriding goal was increased
managerial control, and this entailed the continuity of aspects of the apartheid workplace regime, 
authoritarian management and worker disempowerment in particular. To the extent that a clear 
strategy for increasing competitiveness could be discerned, it appeared to point towards a model of 
lean production in a non-imion or weakly unionised workplace. The umon approach to 
competitiveness differed sharply - at least in principle - and is perhaps best described as a model of 
'intelligent production’ shaped by co-determination.
This chapter attempts to grasp and interpret an extraordinarily rich range of initiatives and counter­
initiatives, both on the shopfloor, and in the sphere of negotiation at company level. Despite the 
interconnection between these diflcient levels of activity, for ease of analysis the chapter concentrates 
first on the negotiations and inicractions ai company level, and then on the interactions and 
coniestations on ihe shopfloor in various plants of the Highveld Steel complex. The third part of the 
chapter assesses the NUMSA and management strategics in terms of their impact on the apartheid 
workplace regime.
[this introduction may need to be rewritten in the light of changes to the hody of the chapter; the 
last sentence is probably inaccurate)
Contesting a new workplace order at company level
The 1993 negotiations'
The first formal occasion on which NUMSA presented Highveld Steel with its proposals to replace 
the apartheid workplace regime w ith a new high-skill, democratic regime based on ‘intelligent 
production' was ihe 1993 wage negotiations Management refused to negotiate these proposals, 
presented in the form of the union’s three-year programme, but suggested instead that two joint 
company-union working groups be established to discuss them. After a short woik stoppage, NUMSA 
won a concession: the number of grades in the grading structure would be reduced from 14 to 8
The fate of this agreement revealed factors that would continue to undermine aitempts to negotiate the 
dismantling of the apartheid workplace regime and replace it with a new workplace order throughout 
the 1990s. Firstly, while the union and the company were able to reach limited agreements on formal 
processes or changes, there was no agreement on the meaning or goals of such processes or changes. 
This rendered them subject to constant contestation and paralysis, and made cooperation impossible. 
Secondly, and linked to this, such agreemenu were limited in scope and narrowly focused rather than 
being integrated into a comprehensive programme for workplace reform. This demonstrated the 
inability of management and union reach any agreement on the necessity and nature of reform
Finally, in those instances where the union successfully created space for proactive intervention, its 
own limited capacity prevented it from doing so.
The two parties reached agreement on combining pairs of the old grades to create the new ones, and 
on the minimum wage rates for each new grade, but avoided discussing the implications of the 
reduction of grades for job descriptions and tasks on the shopfloor. For the union, the reduction of 
grades would only be meaningful if linked to a comprehensive programme for training, multi-skilling 
and upgrading workers, and transforming the organisation of work. Since this had been excluded by 
management, they could not take responsibility for the consequences:
‘We were happy that this was not discussed, so that once they hit a problem we could say. 
You implemented this alone, so we cannot take responsibility for that problem. It is your 
fault. We didn't want a situation where management could blame us when workers 
complained.’
Management on the other hand had been forced into the change and lacked commitment to it. The 
result was that the implementation of eight-grade system generated confusion and conflict on the 
shopfloor. Managers did not understand it and could not explain it clearly. Foremen assumed that 
workers could be instructed to perform tasks of other jobs that were now on the same grade. Workers 
rejected their instructions to perform additional tasks, and foremen reacted that 'your union asked for 
this so go and fight them, it is not our problem. ’ Many of the shopstewards were unable to help 
because they too did not understand the changes. The result was that ‘eveiyone becomes confused and 
people are fighting each other. ’ Managers also found themselves at the receiving end of complaints 
from workers who felt the smaller number of grades reduced their chances of promotion, and others 
who resented finding themselves on the same grade as workers who were previously on lower grades.
The confusion on the shopfloor. and the interpretation of its causes, were highly contested. 
Management argued that workers were unhapp)' with reducing the number of grades. Shopstewards 
responded that workers had no problem with the reduction itself, but that in the process all the 
accumulated anomalies of the 14 grade system were being exposed, and workers were fighting for the 
redress of these. Shopstewards used the confusion to demand greater participation. On the other 
hand, some felt management was using the confusion to discredit the union among workers.
Clearly the reduction of grades did not in itself constitute a step towards a new workplace regime. 
Rather, it highlighted workers’ grievances about their grades, wages and jobs, and threw the entire 
workplace order and hierarchy into question. This created the scope for further struggles for change 
by workers and shopstewards, both on the shopfloor -  a dimension that will be examined later -  and 
in negotiation with management. The shopstewards warned management that ‘either you involve us 
in solving this problem, or you solve it yourself ’ Management then proposed the establishment of a
third joint working group, in addition to the other two, to develop a new grading system for the 
company.
Although the shopstewards had made significant gains, there were also warning signals about union 
capacity, in the negotiations to combine grades the shopstewards were unable to develop their own 
proposals, because 'we could not do the mathematics', so 'Ihumbsuck numbers' were arrived at through 
a process of haggling with management. Workers did not understand the implications of the reduction 
of grades, despite their willingness to down tools in support of the demand. Many shopstewards also 
had a limited understanding of the NUMSA proposals. The limited union rights at the company 
contributed to this problem, making it difficult for shopstewards to meet and develop their 
understanding collectively, and preventing shopstewards from explaining issues to their members.
But the sophistication of the programme itself, and the absence of skilled officials to assist the 
shopstewards. created an ongoing capacity problem. Translating broad policy principles into the 
practical details necessary for implementation was time-consuming and required expertise as well as 
strategic vision -  resources in short supply for bolh the union and the shopstewards.
The joint committees: paralysis over the transition from the apartheid workplace regime 
(1994-5)"
The story of the rise and fall of the three joint union-management working groups established after 
the 1993 negotiations demonstrates the deadlock between NUMSA and Highveld Steel management 
over the nature and goals of the transition from the apartheid workplace regime in the company. The 
union had presented its comprehensive programme for moving towards a new workplace regime.
This was never negotiated in the working groups. Management’s participation in the groups 
indicated a preference for piecemeal, fragmented and gradual process of change -  which should 
remain firmly under management control at all limes. There was no attempt to develop common 
ground for establishing a new regime, and no agreement on the purpose, procedures or goals of the 
groups. ’ The result was deadlock, paralysis and frustration.
The grading committee initially seemed to be working successfully After the company had agreed in 
the 1994 wage negotiations (following the lead of the industnal council where a similar agreement 
was reached) to implement a new five-grade structure based on skill by 19%, as demanded by 
NUMSA, the grading committee was given the task of moving through Highveld Steel, plant by plant, 
developing the new struaure and grading jobs in terms of it. Nhlapo was a NUMSA representative 
on this committee, and because of his vision of the goals of the process, and his tactical sophistication, 
he was able to drive it. In his view managers on the group had little idea of w hat they wanted it to 
achieve so they did not oppose him. He had to contend with other trade unionists in the group whose
instinct was to use every opportunity to create little gaps between workers and pay them a little more -  
between attendant and senior attendant, pusher and senior pusher, between the driver of a 20-ton 
crane and the driver of an 80-ton crane In contrast, Nhlapo worked according to a lon^r-tcrm goal 
of eliminating minor differentials between workers and creating a grading structure based on skill and 
training
He also tried to use the process to strengthen union capacity by insisting that small grading 
committees of shopstewards and managers should be formed in each plant to assess job descriptions, 
and that the working group should refuse to listen to a plant manager unless he was accompanied by 
shopstewards from his plant. This would give shopstewards an opportunity to start engaging with 
their managers and discussing the issues with their members. However, ‘they’re running away, very 
few committees have been formed. ’
After some months of successful progress Nhlapo started feeling that the grading committee posed 
serious dangers for woricers and their union. The problem was that the union proposal for 
broadbanding and producing grades was linked to the proposal for narrowing the 'apartheid wage 
differential' to 60 percent - and while management had accepted the grading structure, it had 
postponed discussion of the wage relativities between grades. Nhlapo was carefully distributing 
workers with some degree of skill into lower grades, rather than trying to inish all skills as high as 
possible, in the expectation that the wage rates of the lower grades could be substantially increased by 
narrowing the wage gap. Howe\ er. if the union lost that argument, the workers with some degree of 
skill could land up on tower rates in the new grading structure. According to Nhlapo, therefore, 'either 
we must agree to begin matching the process of grading with new wage relativities, so that we know 
exactly how workers are going to benefit at the end, or we must stop the process *
When the human resource manager heard what Nhlapo had said, and realised how far the group had 
proceeded, ‘He killed that committee, it was destroyed by management.’ In the 1995 wage 
negotiations management opened by renouncing its commitment to the five-grade system, which 
‘removed the principal of the NUMSA programme’ for ‘overcoming the apartheid work organisation’ 
and nullified six months of labour b>’ the woiking group.
The working group on the relation between the company and the unions also ended in stalemate. The 
NUMSA shopstewards wanted to negotiate an agreement extending union rights in the company and 
defining a role for the union in company restructuring and decision-making. The company envisaged 
a more narrowly focused procedural agreement ‘that disciplines us and tells us how we must behave 
as a union’. At different points either management or NUMSA stalled these negotiations, and th ^  
were finally suspended indefinitely when it became clear that the new ly-drafted LRA would cover 
some of the same ground.
The third working group -  focusing on production quality, multi-skilling and the restructuring of 
work -  also proved fruitless. Since shopstewards did not have the time or resources to develop their 
own proposals, nor was management interested in such a possibility, the shopstewards concentrated 
on preventing management from implementing its own proposals. This was frustrating to everyone 
concerned, and the group was shut down at the same time as the others.
Thus all three groups were paralysed by the completely different understanding and goals of 
management and NUMSA. In the restructuring group, for example, 'management comes with 
proposals, with the view that we must accept them and help implement them, not discuss them’. 
Furthermore, management was continuing to implement restructuring in the plants, 'whether we like 
it or not, whether we have an agreement or not’. For the shopstewards, then, ’the challenge is can we 
stop them, can we counter them in various ways so that they begin to respect us?’ Thus, when a plant 
manager presented proposals for work restructuring to the committee, Nhlapo would demand 
thorough discussion and analysis and insist that he be given a chance to consult his members:
’They're going to be blocked, giving us a chance to sit with our members and develop very 
clear strategies. We can explain to them what management is proposing and what we think 
should happen. Obviously management is not going to agree to our proposals, so the process 
is neither here nor there - but at least you're involving the members so that they'll have a 
picture of where you want to take them, because the company is not going to give us time to 
discuss these issues with workers. Our plans are not going to surface immediately. What is 
going to surface now is education around these issues ’
The shopsteward had no expectation that an agreement with management would emerge from this 
process -  it was simply an opportunity to block management and educate workers. This meant the 
working group had no potential for satislying either parly;
'Management is coming with a framework, and we're operating within that framework but 
not in the direction that they wanted to operate. We’re pushing it in our own direction. 1 
must say, its frustrating. The management representative also says he wants to resign from 
the committee because since we started it nothing has happened. There are no result at all. 
and 1 agree.’
A process marked by such fundamental disagreement had little prospect of producing a new 
workplace regime marked by respect for mutually agreed procedures Procedures would only have 
meaning for workers if they were located in a workplace order that they could regard as having 
legitimacy; in contrast, management continued to believe a legalistic notion of procedure could re­
engineer workplace relations:
'You can put all the documents that you want in place, and think that the courts are going to 
help you, but these workers are not going to cooperate, not now. We can finalise this 
agreement, and go to the workers and say this is how we must behave ourselves, and they 
will agree with you and say Amamllal But when they experience problems they forget about 
agreements. And if we start reminding them that weVe got this agreement, they will say no, 
we will put that agreement aside. We want to deal with management. It's because for years 
management has been taking us to court instead of resolving our problems. Even if the court 
says we're wrong, the problem remains. That's why the procedural agreement is a waste of 
time.'
The process of engaging with the working groups also revealed serious capacity weaknesses in the 
union. There was no-one the shopstewards could rely on for advice or support from the union offices. 
National officials consistently failed to attend meetings where they were expected. Buimy Mahtangu, 
the regional organiser who understood the NUMSA programme, was overextended, and then resigned 
from the union to take up a managerial position in another company in early 1995 Nhlapo was the 
only shopsteward who could consistently engage with management in a proactive fashion He 
reported to the shopsteward committee that:
The work is killing me. 1 am alone. The last meeting of the grading committee was 
cancelled because I was absent. I am carrying my union, I am carrying the other unions, and 
I'm canying management'
These weaknesses meant that the union was unable to present alternative proposals to those put 
forward by management in the working groups on the union-management relationship and on 
restructuring work. In contrast. Nhlapo felt that management was no longer simply reacting in an ad 
hoc way to production problems or union demands, but was beginning to develop the capacity for a 
strategic approach to restructuring. He told the same shopsteward meeting:
To tell the truth, management is seriously looking for answers. Now they do not know the 
answers, but tomorrow they will have them. It took time for them to agree that restructuring 
is necessary - but now they ate attending courses. Do we attend courses? We do not, we are 
just jumping around in the dark '
He also fell that participation in the working groups raised frindamental questions about the goals of 
the NUMSA programme, and about the strategy for achieving them -  questions that neither he nor 
the union had answers to:
Tm not sure whether they are negotiating forums. Are we supposed to reach consensus, or 
does our view of socialism involve struggle? Can we strike for real participation in
decisions, or can we only participate on the shopfloor in green areas? We have never 
negotiated these issues in our bargaining forum, and in the committees you have to be 
diplomatic. We don't have guidelines for these questions '
Imposing cooperation, Imposing discipline:1994-5*
Two management initiatives during 1994 demonstrated that the company continued to have more 
faith in its ability to impose workplace order, than it had in negotiating a new order with the unions. 
In the first initiative, the company tried to impose worker participation through a system of 'green 
areas' and Total Quality Management (TQM). In the seeond, it tried to impose a new disciplinary 
order by changing the disciplinary procedure and giving foremen new disciplinary powers, in both 
cases, union opposition paralysed these initiatives on the shopfloor.
0
Green areas
Several months after the agreement on reduction of grades had been reached in 1993, the human 
resources manager called the shopstewards in and told them that the company wanted to introduce 
green areas as a forum for communication. When the shopstewards raised questions about the 
purpose of the green areas, and their relation to the structure of supervision, they were told the green 
areas were non-negotiable. The shopstewards made it clear that they would not eneourage workers to 
participate in the green areas; instead they would mobilise against them until they were properly 
negotiated.
The shopstewards had themselves previously mentioned to management the idea of green areas as a 
structure of worker participation. They saw the green areas initiative as evidence that management 
was taking their ideas, twisting them to suit their own purposes, and refusing to negotiate them with 
the union. In the view of the shopstewards, green areas had to be linked to a restructuring of 
managerial authority, teamwork, multi-skilling and benefits for workers. But management showed no 
inclination to negotiate these issues, and green areas were to be implemented in isolation 'as an 
island, they don't want to link it with anything - with training, with grading, with production'.
Soon after this, the shopstewards were called to a presentation by senior management, including the 
company MD, on the implementation of a new system of ‘total quality management’ (TQM) in the 
company. The MD explained that it was important for Highveld Steel to change the way they used to 
do things in ll'.c past iiccause of opening markets, increasing competition and political changes'. The 
shopstewards left the workshop feeling that management was not prepared to engage in a serious 
discussion about TQM and the company vision and strategy. TQM did not envisage changing the
management structure, but rather reinforced it. Workers could make suggestions, but supervisors and 
managers would make decisions and there was no clear role for shopstewards or the union. The 
shopstewards were told their role was to inform workers to work hard, as their management was 
capable and would deliver.
The shopstewards’ analysis was that management was introducing change in an ad hoc and 
‘laughable’ fashion, with no clear vision or strategic direction. Sometimes, however, they expressed 
atrxiety that tttanagement was developing 'a  coherent plan’ Since management refused to discirss 
their long-term plans, they would adopt a strategy of blocking every company initiative:
‘You will say to them. Tell us your five-year plan, let us understand your vision, what it is 
that you want to achieve. They respond that the steel industry changes, so you carmot have 
long-term plans. They frustrate you. But they are introducing their plans bit by bit. They 
say, no, this is nothing, it is just about communication. And the trext thing is nothing, it is 
just about something. And at the end of the day when you look at the whole thing you see 
complete restruauring. So we must fight each initiative they try to bring. ’
Ultimately, they hoped, this would compel the company to acknowledge that cooperation could not be 
imposed on workers, but had to be negotiated with the union.
The shopstewards’ campaign against the green areas was generally successfirl, not only because of 
the resistance of workers but also because managers and supervisors, locked into the authoritarian and 
non-participatoty practices of the apartheid workplace regime, did not understand them. Ambrose 
Mthembu, for example, recounted how the steel plant martager told him to explain to the workers how 
green areas would function. He refused to encourage them to participate. Later the workers in his 
section were called by sectional management to a meeting where they were told about the green areas:
I challenged management and they just said they don't understand the system, they are 
carrying out an instruction. I asked them how they expected us to do something that they 
themselves didn’t even understand. So they said they don’t think they ate the right people I 
should be arguing with, it just ended up there ’
it was not difficult to discourage workers from attending green area meetings, as they qttickly 
concluded that they were intended to buttress authority in the apartheid workplace regime instead of 
dismantling it. A migrant worker observed that:
‘We have realised that the green area is taking us nowhere. We would like a green area 
which accords everyone the right to know everything about the firm and about production. 
We left the green area when we saw there is no way it can help us, because it is still
oppressing us. It is taking us back to that apartheid of theirs, not in the direaion which we 
as workers want. ’
Another shopsteward described how green areas simply became another forum for foremen to issue 
instructions as they always had, with no attempt to solve problems collectively.
‘The foreman just comes and tells us, Look, yesterday we rolled so many cobbles [reject 
structural steel]. Please, today don’t do any mistakes. Fine. Do you hear me? We say, fine, 
let's go. The siren blows, we go back on duty. Here come more cobbles....’
As far as the shopstewards were aware, TQM was never implemented. The union mobilisation against 
green areas on the shopfloor was successful, and by the end of 1994 management had conceded as 
much, asking the union to put forward its proposals on how green areas should be implemented. 
Shopstewards talked about holding a workshop together with NUMSA oificials, to formulate their 
own proposals, but this never took place. In early 1995 they gave management a list of issues that 
would need to be negotiated before green areas could be implemented, btit according to Nhlapo the list
- which referred to hours of work, workers' rights, alTirmative action and profit-sharing - was 'just a 
thumbsuck'. By the end of the year the secretaiy of the shopsteward committee admitted that 'the 
problem is that the ball is in our court, because the company has agreed to talk to us and asked us how 
to do this thing successfully', but the shopstewards were overextended outside the company and unable 
to respond. The shopstewards had successfully demonstrated that participation could not be imposed 
in the context of a decaying apartheid workplace regime. But at the point that the union had 
succeeded in compelling management to negotiate participation -  a process which had the potential to 
provide a route towards a new workplace order -  it no longer had the capacity to take the initiative.
Discipline
The second management initiative discussed here was an attempt to restore discipline on the 
shopfloor imposing a new disciplinaty procedure without negotiation in late 1994. A consultant 
had warned the company that the existing code gave too much power to workers. The new code 
increased the disciplinary powers of the foremen (who could hold an 'interview' and give written 
warnings, whereas previously they could only give a verbal warning), reduced the procedural 
protections for the worker (enquiries held only for a final warning, instead of for all written warnings
-  where they were replaced by ‘interviews’; removal of the principal that the person who lodges a 
charge cannot judge the case; no appeals except against a final warning), and whittled away at their 
right to be represented by a shopsteward (compulsion to attend an interview even if a shopsteward 
could not be found during the two hour notification period)
0The shopsteward commitlee responded with the same strategy they had used in 1988 to negotiate 
changes to the disciplinary code without accepting its legitimacy. They referred the dispute to the 
industrial council. At the industrial council dispute hearing the union induced the company to make 
concessions, and outstanding issues were referred to the industrial court. The shopstewards were 
using institutional procedures to block and dilute management's new code, but this did not mean that 
the outcome would be a legitimate disciplinary order or that they would collaborate with management 
attempts to reconstitute discipline on the shopfloor:
'We've made them shift some of the things they had in there, but we've not agreed that it's 
binding on us. Even after the court case there's no way we'll sign the code. We'll follow the 
procedure if it suits us - if it does not, we'll say it's not binding on us. We are repeating the 
approach we used before.'
Shopstewards did not confine their resistance to formal, institutional procedures; they took their 
resistance into the workplace, where they mobilised their members against the new procedures.
Where shopstewards were bold and their members militant, they refused to cooperate with the new 
procedures and threatened stoppages. Supervisors and managers avoided trying to implement them. 
In iron plant one, white foremen approached the union, complaining that they too were opposed to the 
new procedures because workers would not accept them This ended with the majority of them 
joining NUMSA - a process analysed in chapter 15.
The failure of this initiative demonstrated not only that it was impossible for management to 
unilaterally impose cooperation on workers, but also that it was impossible to stem the decomposition 
of the apartheid workplace regime and reconstitute supervisory authority and power by unilaterally 
imposing a tougher disciplinary regime. Discipline could only be reconstituted as an element of a 
new, legitimate workplace order.
Summary
Part one of this chapter demonstrates the inability of the company and NUMSA to negotiate a 
transition from the apartheid workplace regime to a new democratic regime in the workplace during 
the period from 1993 to 1995.
Management appeared to be unable to imagine negotiating the terms of a new workplace order with 
black workers or their union Indeed, they appeared not to be convinced that the existing order was in 
trouble, and to be oblivious to its illegitimacy in workers' eyes, and in this they were as much 
creatures of the apartheid workplace regime as its creators. Their main concern was with efficiency.
quality, cost and competitiveness. Problems of quality and waste seem to have been particularly 
serious. They hoped to address these by grafting green areas, TQM and multi-tasking onto the 
existing regime. Consultation w ith the union was incidental -  discipline, participation and efliciency 
could be imposed from above without addressing the structural features of the workplace regime 
which were causing the process of decomposition
NUMSA, on the other hand, had developed a vision for transformation of the workplace, and was able 
to put forward a comprehensive programme for transition from apartheid to democracy in the 
workplace. However, this lacked detail and practical guidelines for implementation, and the union 
lacked the capacity to develop these when the necessity arose. No union officials were consistently 
available to assist shopstewards, and the shopstewards themselves were overstretched both within the 
factory and beyond it, and lacked the rights and resowces within the workplace (another feature of the 
apartheid workplace regime) to compensate for this. They were able to paralyse management 
initiatives, but were unable to elaborate their own proposals and maintain the initiative when 
opportunities arose.
0
The result was stalemate in negotiation and engagement at the level of company>union relations. Part 
two of this chapter turns to the shopfloor, in order to investigate how management and union 
initiatives played themselves out on that terrain, where the workplace regime was maintained, 
challenged and reformed in the daily process of producing steel.
Contesting a new workplace order on the shopfloor
Contesting lean production: the intensification of work and resistance to it
During the early 1990s shopstewards became aware of a range of measures in the workplace which, 
taken together, constituted a strategy to intensify woilc and increase the numerical and functional 
flexibility of the woridbree. Although many of these measures appeared to be implemented in a 
random and unplanned way, th^ ' indicated a drift towards lean production at Highveld Steel. There 
was a growing use of non-standard contracts -  subcontracting and casual labour. Underlying this was 
a general trend towards the reduction of labour, both through retrenchment and general attrition, 
increasing the workloads and tasks of the remaining workers. It was difficult for the shopstewards to 
get a purchase on these trends because, as Nhlapo pointed out. changes had been implemented before 
the union had developed its own analysis of restructuring;
‘The employers bad started restructuring a long lime ago. before we even thought about it. 
They were doing it their own way. When we woke up they were already on that path. 
Managers have mentioned to me that the reduction of artisan assistants to the ratio of one 
assistant to three artisans was decided on in 1988, after the lockout. At that time we never 
thought that such changes were taking place. Changes are continuously taking place at 
Highveld Steel, but we are unaware of some of those changes because such things are not 
discussed with us.'
There had always been specialist subcontractors at Highveld Steel, but in the early nineties 
management began outsourcing a range of ‘non-core’ operations such as the canteen and housing 
maintenance. This was linked to its new ‘small business initiative”: an employee “who has served 
them very well” would be identified to run the new outsourced business. At first whites were chosen, 
but from the mid-nineties the company became keen to establish small black businesses. While 
management avoided negotiating some of these new arrangements with the unions, outsourcing the 
housing maintenance department involved almost 300 workers and negotiation with the unions was 
preferable to the risk of industrial conflict. NUMSA used this to opportunity to negotiate guidelines 
for regulating subcontracting and outsourcing in general: the company should ensure that 
subcontractors allowed free union activity and complied with any negotiated agreements that covered 
their sector, and NUMSA could represent their workers if they were unorganised. While outsourcing 
and subcontracting was a strategy to increase the flexibility of labour and reduce its bargaining power, 
NUMSA’s strategy was to regulate this and ensure at least a minimal level of regulation and 
representation. In some cases, such as security, the union was actually able to prevent the outsourcing 
altogether. However, by the mid-nineties at least one shopsteward believed there was a growing use of 
subcontractors and even labour brokers for maintenance and specialist work at Highveld Steel.’
The NUMSA shopstcwards adopted similar strategies in response to casualisation, which they first 
noticed in 1989. This became of growing concern to shopstcwards, and by 1994 management had 
agreed to the formation of a committee -  including shopstcwards, managers and two of the casuals -  
to examine the records of all casuals and consider transferring them to permanent contracts. By 
midyear some 20 of the hundred casuals had been employed as permanent workers. This became an 
ongoing project for the shopstcwards. As with outsourcing and subcontracting, their aim was to 
regulate casualisation, limiting it as far as possible by establishing procedures for converting casuals 
into permanent workers, and ensuring that casuals had some form of representation.’
Managerial initiatives to increase flexibility and reduce the bargaining power of workers by replacing 
permanent workers with outsourced, subcontracted or casual labour were underpinned by broader 
strategies to reduce the number of workers in the plants -  whether through retrenchment or natural 
attrition. Management justified its retrenchment of 700 |? | workers in 1991 as a response to 
weakening global markets for steel and vanadium; the shopstcwards accused them of using the market
downturn to mask an attempt to intensity work. Their inability to accomplish this ^stematically 
meant that the company was forced to re-employ the majority of retrenchees when the market 
recovered 11. . i- . r those who had taken early retirement and others who had taken other jobs, 
about one hundred in all. were not replaced. In addition, since the late 1980s, many of the workers 
who were dismissed or promoted had not been replaced, and there was a creeping process of 
increasing the workload and expanding the tasks of those who remained: 'the remaining people had 
to share among themselves the tasks that were performed by that individual who had left'. The 
process of intensilying work and expanding job descriptions usually took place without changing the 
affected workers' grades or pay; however, it was sometimes accompanied by a random process of 
deskilling some jobs, upgrading others and providing some training. Thus the ratio of artisan 
assistants to artisans had decreased over time, generating increasing conflict between them. In a 
maintenance workshop a labourer had been trained to operate a machine previously controlled by an 
artisan. In the finishing end of the structural mill bundlers were refusing managemem instructions to 
do grinding as well as bundling, because they were not promoted into the grade for grinders.’
The drift towards lean production created the impression that management's notion of a post­
apartheid workplace order was focused on increasing the pressure and flexibility of work 1^ getting 
rid of some of the ‘rigidities' of the apartheid workplace regime -  some created by the privileges and 
leverage of white and skilled labour, others by the leverage of militant black unionism -  and 
preserving the authoritarian practices of management. Black workers were quick to resist attempts to 
increase numerical or functional flexibility, whether through subcontracting or casualisation. or 
through expanding job descriptions, because these were reminiscent of the functional (any white can 
instruct any black) and numerical (instant dismissal) flexibilities of the apartheid workplace regime 
before black trade unionism did away with these.
The result was growing conflict on the shopfloor. The creeping changes raised issues of job 
description and demarcation, grading pay, skill and training -  around which there was in any case a 
heightened awareness because of the NUMSA programme’s focus on such issues, and because of the 
reduction from 14 to eight grades In some cases workers’ spontaneous resistance provided an 
opportunity for shopstewards to launch counter-initiatives -  but in others shopstewards themselves 
became victims of workers’ frustrations.
The steel planl‘
The steel plant exemplified the processes described above. Over a period of several years 
retrenchment, dismissals, retirement and promotions had led to multi-Uisking increased workloads 
and grading anomalies. In many cases managers persuaded workers to accept these changes with 
promises of upgrading and increased pay. 'making agreements’ with individual workers and 
bypassing the shopstewards -  who could sec dangers but were powerless to intervene. Workers were
not doing this with the union, they were just doing these things on their own and we, as shopstewards 
were not informed. ’ In other cases deriving from the period before 1990, workers had been induced to 
accept extra tasks for fear of losing their jobs. In addition, there were grading anomalies going back to 
apartheid as well as deriving from the more recent but partial implementation of the Patterson 
grading system in 1989. The senior shopsteward in the steel plant, Ambrose Mthembu, reported the 
admission by one of his managers of how apartheid had shaped the grading structure:
‘With apartheid, we had to protect the whites, we had to make sure they didn't earn the 
same salary as the blacks. That is why we created these posts specifically to accommodate 
whites, instead of him losing their jobs.'
For example, the (white) senior sweeper could issue instructions to a (black) sweeper and was on a 
higher grade, but there actual duties were exactly the same -  although ‘this one works mote, that one 
works less, because he is going to issue instructions and watch the other one carrying out the 
instruction’.
Eventually, as management failed to deliver on its promises of increased pay, workers became 
disillusioned:
‘The lime came when everyone was now sick and tied of hoping for the better, and that’s when we 
found our chance to start addressing these issues. They used to raise their grievances through the 
foreman, not really the way they should be raised. When they realised there are no tangible results, 
then they started coming to this has a union. As shopstewards we had to tell them the truth, that they 
have done wrong by taking this to a foreman. They had to understand that we, as the shopstewards, 
are more capable of dropping in than their foremen. ’
Mthembu raised the workers’ grievances with the steel plant management. Management’s response 
was delayed by various factors. Then, while Mthembu was away on a course, the steel plant workforce 
downed tools in a wildcat strike over their grievances. On his return to work a couple of days later, 
Mthembu found that the stoppage had created a platform I could stand on, I could see management 
was now prepared to see problems being resolved’. Mthembu was given time to examine the tasks and 
grading of the workers, and found that as attrition had reduced the number of grade 5 workers, those 
on grade 8 were required to assist them with their jobs, without any compensating increase in pay. He 
was able to persuade the steel plant manager that the grade 8 workers should be upgraded to grade 7, 
that grade 8 should be done away with, and that an additional nine workers should be employed on 
grade 5 to handle the workload.
It was only the workers’ resort to unprocedural action which provided Mthembu with the ’platform’ to 
make these gains:
1 couldn't have done these things if people had not come up with their grievances and exert the t>pe 
of pressure which made management's heart turn in the right direction.'
But he also had to convince his manager that multi-skilling and upgrading would benefit production:
'1 explained multi-skilling to my manager, I had to convince him that he is going to benefit because 
he will have a pool of people who can do most of the duties. If there is a shortage on one job, he can 
take anyone to assist -  unlike presently, if there is a shortage of people then the job has to stand still. 
That is a way of increasing production, and we as NUMSA believe that we should increase production 
and profit. Then we can do better in negotiations -  maybe that is where the money will come from to 
reinvest in training and also job creation Our demands are relevant to the RDP, which came from the 
unions and has been turned into a document of the politicians. But you can't just rely on the 
government, we have to do it in the plant.’
The lesson drawn by Mthembu was that 'we should start pushing the NUMSA proposals in the 
various departments, so that management can find itself in a comer.’ A problem was lack of 
coordination among the shopslewards, so that the committee was unaware of his efforts in the steel 
plant, and there was no sharing of ideas and experiences. He was hopeful that after the 1994 elections 
such coordination could be established.
The stmggles in the steel plant illustrate how management attempts to intensify work and increase 
flexibility simply exposed the anomalies and racial hierarchies of the apartheid workplace regime and 
generated increased conflict. A shopsteward equipped by the NUMSA programme to engage on 
issues of grading and skills could use workers' frustration and resistance to put forward counter­
proposals for upgrading and increased staffing levels, with some success This example also 
illustrates a theme that emerges over and over at Highveld Steel during the 1990s: management 
attempts to bypass the union and eUcit ‘wildcat cooperation' by promising workers improved pay or 
skills. But because lean production measures tend to focus quite narrowly on cost and multi-tasking, 
workers soon became frustrated and launched their own wildcat resistance. The nature of the new 
workplace order to emerge from the discredited remnants of the apartheid workplace regime was still 
highly contested, and there was a lack of mutually accepted codes for negotiating change. The role of 
Mthembu suggested that a new order could only be esUiblished through accepting the central role of 
the shopslewards.
Workers in a particular section at Vantra had a similar experience They launched a 24-hour wildcat 
strike over grading and wage grievances, and then refused to work overtime. Meshack Malinga was 
able to intervene and win a 20 cent per hour increase, and a new shift of 12 workers was employed to 
make up for the overtime.’ In the structural mill the shopslewards negotiated the training of crane and 
train drivers to diagnose and fix faults in their equipment, and their upgrading to utility men.'°
In the flat products rolling mill a five day wildcat strike sparked olT by a dispute over a requirement 
that operators should clean beneath the furnaces during maintenance shutdowns, led to the formation 
of a committee to resolve workers’ grievances." The committee included shopstewards and rank-and- 
flle workers, and one of the workers was given a week off to investigate and rewrite all job 
descriptions in the plant. Some workers were upgraded and other recommendations were passed on to 
the company-level grading committee. It exerted pressure for promotion of black workers, and four 
black foremen were appointed The committee also negotiated the installation of conveyor belts under 
the furnace and mills to make the cleaning job easier. In addition, the committee was tackling the 
issue of racial segregation, negotiating the integration of old facilities such as mess- rooms, toilets and 
change-houses, including the construction of new ones and the conversion of old ones into offices 
where physical integration was not practical. One of the workers co-opted onto this committee 
commented on how empowering this had been:
'The manager told us we could only discuss safety. We said to ourselves we should work very, very 
hard in order to prove to him that we were not there has safety representatives, but we were going to 
sit around that table with them as their equals, despite the fact at they were occupying senior 
positions. We felt that because the job descriptions were initially written by management we should 
not involve them. If someone pushes you into a river, he's not the one who is going to take you out of 
there. You should stand up on your own -  it's your duty to get out of that river yourself. We were 
able to achieve things that we never thought we would achieve, because our divisional management is 
known as a management that used to fire people at will. People were not willing to be members of 
that committee because they feared they would end up outside the company. ’
But not all such struggles ended well for shopstewards. Shopstewards who did not understand the 
grading system, or the new NUMSA programme, could easily find themselves the targets of workers’ 
anger and undermined by management Such a situation developed at Rand Carbide where JJ 
Mbonani was the senior shopsteward.'’ Workers had similar grievances to those in other plants, 
including the fact tliat several categories of workers, such as crane drivers and operators, were graded 
below workers in the steelworks who performed similar jobs. After months of raising their grievances 
with shopstewards. with their union organiser, and with supervisors, workers simply downed tools 
and demanded increased rates of pay. They also threatened to march to the NUMSA local office and 
withdraw from the union en masse unless it did something to help them with their grievances. Leslie 
Nhlapo, chairperson of the steelworks committee, became involved and negotiated the upgrading of 
those workers whose jobs could be compared with jobs in the steelworks, and suggested the newly- 
established grading committee should embark on a systematic grading exercise at Rand Carbide. 
However, workers’ unhappiness with the union in general and Mbonani in particular did not abate 
Nhlapo frequently failed to attend meetings because of his many commitments beyond the workplace; 
the organiser was 'unable to move an inch, he doesn’t understand the issues’; and management
continued to undermine Mbonani referring workers with problems to him and telling them that 
they should ask him for an increase. Nhlapo commented
‘It’s sad to lose a guy like Mbonani, who has been there since the days ofMAWU. You
cannot continually defend him if the workers say they no longer need his services.
Somewhere you should just let it go, or you will have divisions like in 1987.’
Eventually Mbonani resigned as a shopsteward, complaining that some shopstewards ‘are acting like 
bosses’ and others were not pulling their weight, and returned to his vocation as a lay preacher.
This section has shown that management’s attempt to implement elements of a lean production 
strategy focusing on the intensification of work and increasing functional and numerical flexibility 
failed to create a new workplace order acceptable to workers. It was not an attempt to alter the 
enduring aspects of the apartheid workplace regime -  the racial distribution of power, skills and 
incomes embedded in the grading and wage structure -  but rather attempted to increase productivity 
and reduce costs without altering the basis of the workplace regime. The management’s reluctance to 
consult with the uttion, seeking instead to bypass the shopstewards and elicit ‘wildcat cooperation’, 
indicates that a shift in the distribution of power played no part in its thinking. Management 
appeared to hold the view that lean production techniques could simply be grafted onto the regime 
that had emerged from the apartheid era, thus dissolving Uie ‘rigidities’ created by white power and 
privilege, on the one hand, and the emergence of militant black trade unionism on the other. This 
was a particularly impoverished view of the nature of a post-apartheid order in the woikplace, and 
workers’ response was resistance. To them, the lean production techniques signaled a desire on 
management’s part to return to the flexibilities of the apartheid workplace before the union began to 
protect them from atbitrary dismissals and lack of job ownership.
It is quite striking that all the incidents discussed in this seaion involved wildcat actions. This 
suggests that workers recognised that there had been no signifleant redistribution of workplace power 
or reform of managerial practices, and that the only way to ensure that their voices were heard was to 
down tools. Their recourse to the repertoire of actions which they had created in the 1980s indicates 
that the illegitimacy of the apartheid workplace regime endured into the nineties. The workplace 
regime remained highly contested, and workplace relations remained ‘ungovernable’ by procedure 
and negotiation.
The prevalence of wildcat actions also suggests a crisis in union strategy and shopsteward 
representation. The emergence of wildcat cooperation’ in some plants suggests the same thing. 
Workers were not automatically turning to their shopstewards to lead their resistance to management 
strategies (or their participation in them), but were throwing up an alternative grassroots leadersliip. 
Some of the most dynamic shopstewards were frequently unavailable, being involved in union or
political activities beyond the workplace. Many of the others felt disempowered by the complexity of 
the new NUMSA programme and were unable to provide leadership in response to management 
initiatives. The social structure of the union itself was weakened and contested -  a process which 
forms the subject of the next chapter.
Despite these weaknesses, the wildcat resistance of workers provided the three or four shopstewards 
w ho were confident of their goals and able to develop the sophisticated proposals and strategies they 
required, with the opportunity -  ‘the platform’ -  to develop counter-initiatives inspired by the uttion 
programme and spearhead their implementation. These counter-initiatives give some idea of the 
potential of the NUMSA programme for reforming the apartheid workplace regime.
The union construction of a new order: worker control and Intelligent production on the 
tapping floor
The shopstewards -  Leslie Nhlapo in particular -  made several attempts to implement the union 
strategy in a more coherent fashion on the shopfloor in specific workplaces. This was successful in 
only one case, the tapping floor in iron plant one, where the collective solidarity and militancy of the 
w orkers reinforced by the strategic sophistication of Nhlapo compelled management to accept a 
difierent way of organising work.
Nhlapo started identifying opportunities in the early nineties to experiment with the new perspective 
developing within NUMSA. when some managers started to approach shopstewards for help in 
implementing changes.
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'Seemingly Trevor Jones (the MD| would go around and look for ideas, and once he has got 
an idea he calls his managers tubular and says, Look, 1 have got this fine idea. Can you go 
down and implement it'? Then they would leave that room, not sure of what they had to do, 
so they would come to us and say. Look guys, we must do this. And we asked them to 
explain further, and they wouldn’t be able to explain.’
Thus in 1991 the manager at the structural mill told Mcshack Malinga and Leslie Nhlapo that he 
wanted a 'productivity deal’ whereby various jobs would be combined.'* The two shopstewards came 
back with a proposal to reduce the number of grades from 14 to five, multi-skill and upgrade the 
workers, and place redundant workers elsewhere. The manager responded angrily that he 'never 
wanted such crazy ideas’ so 'we left him and he was stranded'.
Nhlapo got a bit fiirther with his second experiment at the beginning of 1992. The manager of the 
flat products division, Mike Bowker (his name will crop up again), was a particularly innovative 
manager. He wanted to combine the workers from the trimming and cutitng machines on the two 
production lines -  plate and strip -  into one cul-to-length crew’. Leslie Nhlapo and Ezekiel Nkosi 
developed a proposal that the eight workers involved on each shift should all be trained to operate all 
the machines on both lines, be upgraded to the level of the most skilled worker in the group and paid 
accordingly, and operate as a team. Bowker agreed with this, but was ’frustrated’ by senior 
management who insisted that new ways of organising work should not cost the company increased 
wages. Management fashioned a counter-proposal in which the members of the crew would be graded 
at three different levels according to their most frequently performed tasks, but would still be required 
to nil in for workers on higher grades when necessary. The shopstewards rejected this, and the plan 
was abandoned
Nhlapo’s third attempt was successful.”  At about the same lime as the flat products proposal, he 
heard that there were problems on the lapping floor in the iron plant. The tapping crews were 
initialing frequent stoppages in support of their demands for upgrading and belter wages. The six 
lapping floors arc located at the bottom of the six furnaces in the iron plant. The Job of the lapping 
crews on each floor is to open the tap-hole when the smell is ready, so that the molten iron and slag 
can run out of the furnace, through the brick-and-sand launders which function like gutters, and over 
edge of the tapping floor into the wailing slag-pot and iron-pot. The slag is dumped and the molten 
iron is transported to the steel plant for processing into steel and vanadium slag. The tapping crew 
drills the tap-hole open, monitors the separation of iron and slag by the skimmers in the launder, 
releases the flow of separated iron into the iron-pot at the right moment, and tries to prevem spills. 
After the lap, their job is to clean the launders of iron and slag, clean up any spills that occur when 
slag or iron overflow the launder, and then prepare the launder and skimmer for the next lap
Conditions of work on the tapping floor are arduous and dangerous in the extreme. Workers have to 
work in thick protective suits because of the heal of the molten iron and the danger of spills. 
Dehydration and heat exhaustion sometimes caused workers to collapse, and workers were injured 
and sometimes died in spills. Leaking caibon monoxide gas had also caused fatalities. One of the 
lapping floor workers described these conditions:
'Conditions on the tapping floor are very dangerous I am used to the place so I can work 
there with ease, but for a new person it is a very dangerous place. Whenever you are on the 
tapping floor you should always do w hat the people who work there do. not run away or lake 
the wrong direction.’
The tapping floor was a harsh working environment, not only because of the physical conditions, but 
also because of the treatment by supervisors:
‘It was tough on the tapping floor. If the>' regarded you as cheeky they would send you there. 
If you complained about wages you were sent there as well. It was a white-dominated 
wotking site, it was an apartheid workplace. The treatment there was not & r . '
Most of the Uppers were illiterate migrant workers, many of them Pedi-speakets. Many had worked 
on the tapping floor for long periods of their working lives. More recently, with the change in the 
company’s recruiting policy, relatively highly educated young township residents had begun to appear 
on the Upping floor, but these workers tended to be promoted fairly quickly to operate the kilns or 
hirnaces. Each Upping team was led by a baas-boy or induna. When the fit mace operator decided 
that the smelt was ready for Ui^ing, he informed the foreman, who then instructed the baas-boy to 
^  sUrt upping. The baas-boy then instructed the members of his team to get ready, while he drilled
open the up-hole. The Upping team members were graded as labourers on grade 14, while the baas- 
boy was on grade 13. Absenteeism was fairly high on the Upping floor, and afler they had finished 
Upping their furruce Uppers in one team were frequently instructed to join another team and assist 
with U^ring a second furnace. This was a chafing point for the workers, who felt entitled to rest 
between Ups because of the grueling nature of their work.
The Uppers felt that the harsh conditions of their work merited higher wages, and during 1990 they 
Uunched a series of small stoppages demanding to discuss their problems with their manager. 
Eventually they were promoted -  the Uppers by one grade, and the baas-boy by three. This 
exacerbated the uppers’ grievances, and they began demanding to also be promoted three grades. 
Although the induna was supposed to open the Up-hole, all the Uppers knew how to perform this 
usk. It had long been a custom on the upping floor that if the induna was not present, the foreman 
would instruct another member of the team to do so. Now they refused, on the grounds that they were 
not paid to perform this Usk:
'Management would come and just point at anyone and tell them to do the job. So we 
realised at we have the same know ledge, but we are not paid for the work. That is why we 
came up with this grievance, after realising that we almost knew the same thing. ’
Management bent company policy and offered to pay the Upper who filled in for the induna an acting 
allowance at the higher rate. This worked for three months, and then the Uppers again refused to 
cooperate:
‘If the baas-boy was absent no-one would open the Up-hole. The operator eould not move 
from his pulpit and come down to the Upping floor So he would phone the superintendent. 
The superintendent, not knowing the skills of open the up-hole would phone the manager, 
and he would come and sUrt begging the guys to open the hole. But they would just sit down 
and say. You do it. Once the up-hole is open we will work. But now the Up-hole is closed
and there is no-one to open it. If the manager called another baas-boy to come and do it the 
guys would threaten to walk off the floor. If management called a worker who refused to 
open the lap-hole, or refused to assist another learn, to a disciplinary inquiry, all of the 
workers on the lapping floors would leave their work and go to the inquiry, and say. We are 
going to witness this inquiry ’
It was at this point that Nhlapo intervened:
‘If you go to the lapping floor, that’s where the strength of the union is. These guys are 
highly, highly militant, so you need to be cautious on how you deal with them. I never had 
good relations with them If you take the period from 1987, those were the guys who were 
against artisans becoming shopstewards. I used this opportunity to prove to them that it is 
not true that artisans would mess you around. Sometimes we can help, because we might 
have better ideas, where the other shopstewards might not understand.’
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Since the tapping floor occupied a key place in the production process -  any delay here brought the 
entire steel plant to a sUindstill -  management was under intense pressure to resolve the workers' 
grievances. The iron plant manager agreed that the tappers could be upgraded to grade 12, but 
insisted that it should be paid for by reducing the number of workers per team. The numbers per team 
had been reduced from nine to seven in the 1991 retrenchments, and at the same time a mechanical 
grab had been introduced to help clean the workplace after tapping. Management proposed that the 
size of the teams be frozen at their new levels, and justified this by arguing that the grabs had reduced 
the workload. Since this would not entail any fresh reduction, workers ‘were ready to fall for if  until 
Nhlapo pointed out that it could intensify work because the grabs were subject to frequent 
breakdowns, and that it would make it more difficult to have their former workmates who had been 
retrenched re-employed.
Nhlapo proposed to the tappers that, instead, work should be reorganised so that they worked as a 
self-directed w orkteam. Their job descriptions should be expanded to include drilling open the tap-
hole for tapping, using the.......gun to shoot open the lap-hole when it was blocked, repairing the
brickwork in the launders, minor welding work, and checking and replacing the safety screens. All 
tappers should be trained in these tasks and in leadership and team skills, and upgraded to grade 10. 
There should no longer be a baas-boy, but each team should elect its ow n leader and this position 
should be rotated. The workers agreed. This seemed like a proposal that would not only satisfy their 
demand for more money, but also alter the racial and skill hierarchies of the apartheid workplace 
This was attractive to migrants who were located at the bottom of the apartheid hierarchy:
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'Leslie came to our rescue with the suggestion that since there were jobs that w hat were doing lhai we 
could do, why don’t those jobs be done by us, so that our rale can also be equal to theirs.’
The proposal was put to management. At the same time, workers applied their work-to-rule tactics to 
the grab Whenever the grab ceased functioning -  which was a frequent occurrence -  the entire team 
would stop working until two extra workers were found or the grab was repaired. At about this time 
the progressive manager from flat products, Mike Bowker, was shifted to the iron plant. Being more 
open to cooperating with the shopstewards, and welcoming innovative suggestions, he agreed to get 
rid of the grabs and expand the teams again, and motivated acceptance of proposals for teamwork and 
upgrading to senior management. Agreement was reached on a two-month training programme.
While one shift was attending this program, the other two shifts each worked a 12-hour shift.
The new organisation of work on the tapping floor constituted a radical break with the work 
organisation of the apartheid workplace regime. For most of the unskilled migrants on the tapping 
floors this was the first training they had received. This was the case for Albert Makagula, a migrant 
who had worked there for ten years:
‘We only realised how well we do the job after we had been for training. The job is the 
same, nothing change4 but what has improved now is the sense that we all have equal 
knowledge about the job and everyone knows what to do, and there are no conflicting ideas 
on the job that we are doing. That is the ftiUilling thing, that everyone knows exactly what to 
do and why, and that’s why it’s better now. ’
The training, upgrading and increased pay for tappers implied a recognition of the skills, experience 
and importance of a group of black workers who had been least acknowledged in the apartheid 
workplace regime. According to collective memory on the tapping floors, white workers had once 
been responsible for open the tap-holes, and the black workers who replaced them had been paid 
much less: Throughout the years we were paid in a discrimination way Now for the first time we 
succeeded in forcing management to pay us equally with the whites ’ The tappers had also won the 
right to job ownership' defined by a job in a particular team on a specific tapping floor. Tappers 
could no longer be instructed to assist in another team some of whose members were absent. Instead, 
workers from the preceding and following shifts would be requested to work overtime - 12-hour shifts 
rather than 8-hour shifts - to cover absenteeism, which meant increased overtime pay.
The culture of solidarity on the tapping floor had always been strong, and it was reinforced by the 
new way of working The workers there felt it was important for new workers to share their 
experience:
‘The new people who come in should also go for the same training, so that whatever they are 
paid and w hatever job they do is equal to everyone else. That is what the fight is all about 
now, that every person who comes into the job should also go for training.’
The creation of self-directed teams was a direct challenge to the racial structure of power centered on 
the foremen -  and management resistance to removing them suggests how important they were to the 
functioning of the workplace regime .
‘We said, OK, remove this foreman, because when there are problems, when there is 
spillage, this foreman just stands there and says, Iferk.' Werk! tVerk! -  but he has got no 
idea how to do this work himself Remove this foreman, he must never be in contact with 
these people. The furnace operator, let it be his responsibility to move from the culprit and 
tell the tappers that it is time to tap. So when there are problems the operator and the 
tapping team can communicate, unlike the foreman who just gives instructions and goes 
away -  when there are problems there is no-one to talk to. It was a tough battle.
Management said. No, this foreman is important. We said. He has got no role here. 
Eventually management agreed and the foreman was removed.’
The importance of the new way of working, in Makagula's view, was that workers could control their 
work and protect each other from the racism and victimisation of management:
'Before, the manager would come to tell us to start tapping and would interfere with our 
work in many ways -  even though we knew what we were supposed to do. Sometimes there 
would be fire and someone would be dismissed for it without any proper investigation.
That’s when we realised the need for unity amongst ourselves. Multi-skilling and teamwoik 
are important, in this way we are more protected and we can protect each other. The way we 
now work at the iron plant is one of the ways 1 hope to see democracy in the workplace, 
because 1 find myself feeling happy with the way we work. There is no harassment from 
white people.’
Instead of being oppressed by the foreman, workers could develop their own leadership skills:
‘If workers are scattered and there is a job that needs to be done, the leader is the person who 
organises everyone and calls them together and tells them what to do. If management comes 
about a problem in the plant, or wants to know why a particular worker is absent, then he 
knows who to speak to. That is why there has to be a leader at all times. The former baas- 
boys are still with us, and probably they are happier than us with the new arrangement, 
because it used to be the difficult for them.’
A second of the tapping floor shopslewards, Hendrik Nkosi. commented on how w orkers’ attitude to 
work had changed with the change in the structure of power:
Before, the baas-boy was part and parcel of the foreman The foreman had to assist the 
baas-boy because the people didn’t do the job properly. The people were not working 
properly -  not to say they didn’t know the job, but the baas-boy was driving the people and 
the people were fighting the bosses. Now people are doing the job properly, the people are 
happ)’ about this system. They assist the team leader, whereas they never helped the baas- 
boy. I don’t see the foreman’s job at the tapping floor now, he’s got nothing to do.’
Nkosi described the collective resolution of disciplinary problems:
0
‘The leader calls the whole team to say. Let’s talk with this gentlemen, because it’s many 
times he has come late, or maybe when he’s present he is not doing the job properly. Lets 
gel from him what is his problem. So the team sits down and talks to the gentleman.’
If that doesn’t solve the problem the leader would call some members from another team to assist, or 
even involve a shopsteward. This was a process of trying to solve the problem through discussion 
rather than punishment. Management’s disciplinary procedures remained in place if the problem 
could not be solved by the workers. Nkosi stressed that this approach also protected workers from 
managerial discipline:
'It is important to understand that if the man is absent and he didn’t report to the team, the 
team can’t defend him from management’s disciplinary inquiry because they can’t explain 
why he is absent. If he talks with the team, they can tell management not to worry, he 
e.\plained that he would be absent today.’
There were limitations to the lapping floor experiment. For Nhlapo, there had not been a shift to real 
multi-skilling. He would have liked to see the tappers trained to operate the furnace as well, thus 
abolishing the distinction between tappers and operators, but the tappers’ lack of formal education 
made this impossible. Welding was not including on the training course, and in practice the tappers 
^  did not patch the launders. Several of the tappers confirmed that they had not learnt new work skills
on the training course, since they already had the skills to do their job. What was new was the 
training in leadership skills, and information about how the furnace worked. Other than that, the 
chief contribution of the training course was that it gave formal recognition to the informal skills of 
the workers.
The new organisation of work on the tapping floors was not based on a reorganisation of work and 
production in the entire plant, but was rather like an enclave of workers control carved out of the 
apartheid workplace regime. This rendered it vulnerable to erosion over time. The migrant worker 
activist, Tshagata, moved to the lapping floor after the new arrangements had been pul in place, 
because he had heard that the pay was better. He did not receive any training, and observed that the
racial division of labour persisted because the task of shooting open the tap-hole if it was blocked was 
still reserved for the white foreman:
‘We blacks mainly work for the whites I must go and elect the gun and place it properly for 
him. so that he can shoot. The white man will just come and shoot, and this job of shooting 
is not really work. After he has finished he goes away, and I continue with the work.’
Despite the limitations, the union was able to combine the traditional militancy and solidarity of the 
tapping floor workers with the insights of its new programme in constructing a new regime on the 
lapping fioors, even if it was only an enclave in the still-intact broader apartheid workplace regime.
As one of the iron plant shopstewards put it: ‘we have taken the workers out of their Egypt, now they 
are in Jerusalem ’ This new regime dismantled the racial hierarchy of skill, income and our. and 
replace it with the collective organisation and control of their work by black workers. This new 
regime nurtured workers' solidarity, democracy and leadership skills. Workteams elected and rotated 
their own leaders, removing the racist and authoritarian power of the foreman. Workers endeavored 
to resolve problems of discipline and performance collectively, building their collective solidarity and 
protecting workers against managerial discipline. While the new regime entrenched a greater sphere 
of workers control over their work, it also created the possibility for greater cooperation with 
management.
Workers did in fact try to extend their control over discipline -  in cooperation with management -  but 
this revealed the instability of a new regime established within the greater apartheid workplace 
regime. It started with the continuing problem of endemic absenteeism on the tapping floors. Bowker 
and the tapping floor shopstewards discussed this, and reached agreement that the tapping floor 
workers should establish their own disciplinary committee with the authority to suspend persistent 
absentees for periods of up to several days without pay. In return, management would suspend its 
own disciplinary procedures. Accounts as to the source for this proposal differ. Some iron plant 
workers and shopstewards argued that workers developed this strategy in order to protect themselves 
from excessive work and their workmates from ftnal warnings and dismissals, and it certainly had 
parallels elsewhere in the company, both during the eighties (chapter 4) and the nineties (chapter 11) 
Others say Bowker first approached workers about the problem of absenteeism. Nhlapo believed that 
the idea had originated with Bowker -  who had floated it with him. and been put out when Nhlapo 
rejected it out of hand. Nhlapo argued that management was responsible for discipline because it paid 
workers’ wages; it was ‘immoral’ for workers to discipline another worker, and it would cause 
division and cliques among them.
Then came the 1994 elections, and the workers on the tapping floor tried to turn their disciplinary 
powers to use in building their collective solidarity in the union. In the days preceding the elections 
the workers in iron plant -  particularly the migrants on the tapping floors -  became concerned about
0how they would participate. The union had negotiated an agreement with the company that workers 
would come to work the polling days, but that management would find ways to accommodate workers 
who had problems. How would workers who lived in faraway rural areas vote, the iron plant workers 
wanted to know? By this time the shopsteward leadership at Highveld Steel was working hill-time on 
the ANC election campaign. The iron plant shopstewards raised their concern with management. 
They argued aherwards that management had agreed that workers could leave work for two days to 
vote, but management clearly had a different understanding. When the woikers returned to work, 
they found that two workers -  including a black foreman - had actually worked through the elections. 
They decided to apply their disciplinary powers, and suspended the two workers for two weeks.
These events demonstrated how far management and workers were from establishing a mutually 
understood workplace regime. The iron plant constituted an uneasy coexistence between two 
incompatible regimes rather than a single new regime. Management was incensed at the election 
stayaway and at the suspensions. For workers this simply confirmed that what managers continued to 
ignore the concerns of black workers. One of them recalled his confrontation with the human 
resources manager:
'So I asked Hugo if he did not know that the were going to have elections, and having that 
knowledge, what arrangements had he made to ensure that Highveld woikers would have 
easy access to the writing stations. He could not answer me, and said that according to him 
voting was not that much of a problem. I asked whether we as blacks have voted before? He 
said. No. I then said if voting was not a problem, do you think that we knew that? 1 further 
asked him whether he knew what voting meant to us blacks. He responded that it was a new 
experience for us. 1 said to him, since it was a new thing to us, it was bound to give us 
problems. Because you had experience, you should have enlightened us and helped us make 
arrangements so as to avoid the problems. He just left in the middle of the meeting. ’
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At a second meeting the same worker argued that iron plant management had agreed that workers 
could go home to vote, and threatened that in future workers would no longer agree to work on public 
holidays'*:
'1 then told Hugo that since the government has changed, we now have a people’s 
government, from now on, for each holiday under this new government we at iron plant one 
of not going to come to work, whether he paid us for not. He left in the middle of the 
meeting again.'
In the first exchange the worker points to the white manager’s inability to understand the significance 
of the election for black workers. In the second he underscores the significance of the new 'people’s 
government’ -  which highlights the illegitimacy of the workplace regime which continues to entrench
white power -  and threatens that workers will reject all customs and agreements that originated 
within that regime. This conflict was intensified by the harsh conditions workers worked under:
'Conditions there are bad. You have got very militant workers and management trying to 
pul pressure on them But now management is saying they must relax the pressure, and 
instead make them more cooperative by involving them. But these guys don’t have those 
things in their minds. They still feel the conditions as bad as they were. That’s why there is 
always a clash between iron plant workers and management.’
Workers had attempted to appropriate disciplinary powers from management in order to further 
extend the enclave of workers’ control. The internalisation of disciplinary problems workers also 
suited management’s purposes, and agreement was reached. However, this arrangement was deeply 
unstable. The political transition highlighted the continuity of white domination and racial inequality 
in the workplace, and workers made use of their new disciplinary powers to buttress black solidarity 
and ensure they could participate in the elections. This was not what management had envisaged, 
and the agreement broke down.
One of the iron plant shopstewards commented that the strong form of worker-controlled discipline 
had not been fairly applied. Some workers were treated leniently while others were punished harshly 
by the disciplinary committee, and there were no clear procedures or rights to representation. It 
appeared that Nhlapo had been right Nonetheless, management had benefited from improved 
discipline, and they invited the iron plant shopstewards to discuss new ways of cooperating on 
discipline. The latter had drawn their own conclusions and rejected the invitation:
’We as shopstewards don’t want to be involved in such things, because we are not going to 
charge the people. We as shopstewards will represent the people. That is our job.’
Tshagata, on the other hand, expressed regret that workers’ control of discipline had ended It 
protected workers’ jobs and pointed to a regime governed by ’the law of freedom’: 5
T m  sad about the end of that committee. It was able to consider that the children of the worker 
should continue to eat. because when he came back from suspension he was not dismissed. In my 
view it was good, because it accorded with the law of freedom.'
Management initiatives and wildcat cooperation: a management-driven construction of a 
new workplace order”
The previous section of this chapter described how the union successfully established a new 
democratic workplace regime as an enclave within the I / ’u-c ’iiartheid workplace regime in the iron 
plant. The iron plant was also the site for the most comprehensive management initiative to construct 
a new workplace order on its own terms.
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Mike Bowker was shifted from flat products and appointed works manager at iron plant one in the 
course of 1992. In the shopstewards’ experience he was different from any other manager at Highveid 
Steel, keen to innovate and experiment, open to discussion and consultation with the union and the 
shopstewards. He had a different style, interacting and discussing with ordinary workers on the 
shopfloor and visiting shopstewards at home.
His strategy for eliciting cooperation from workers was to work with groups of workers in different 
sections of the plant on ways to reorganised work, without the constraints of negotiating with the 
union over the broader implications of these local changes. He would identify common interests 
through a process of negotiation and consultation with workers, and try to accommodate their 
demands -  usually for increased pay -  by linking these to a reorganisation of the work process. In 
this way, the workers would be won over through increased levels of skill, pay and responsibility to 
his goals of increasing efficiency and reducing costs. In driving this process, Bowker could build a 
worker constituency supportive of his vision of workplace change, weakening the union’s links to its 
own constituency and the shopstewards’ ability to challenge his project and drive their own Through 
constructing this kind of participation, Bowker could ensure that management retained ultimate 
control over workplace restructuring and over production
Leslie Nhlapo first became aware of Bowker’s plans when these were presented at the company-level 
restructuring committee. The centrepiece of Bowker ’s thinking was to restructure the work of the
foremen. Traditionally, two foremen supervised the.......kilns and the hot-charge cars which loaded
the pre-rcduced iron into the furnace bunkers, and three foremen supervised the six furnaces with 
their tapping floors, as well as the transport of the molten iron to the steel plant. Bowker proposed 
that instead there should be six foreman, each responsible for controlling the entire production 
process from kiln through hot-charge to furnace, tapping floor and transport to the steel plant.
Nhlapo thought this a marvellous proposal’ promising ’very significant changes that 1 can call real 
restructuring’ because it would replace the fragmented structure of supervision with one where the 
foreman would have responsibility for an integrated production process and for the quality of the 
product at the end. This had the potential to reduce the high level of waste product in the iron plant, 
and have a substantial impact on efficiency in the steel plant, where the frequency of poor product 
from the iron plant meant constant monitoring and corrective measures.
Despite his enthusiasm for the proposals, Nhlapo was concerned that Bowker was reluctant to discuss 
the broader implications of more skilled and responsible foremen for their grading, both in the iron
plant and the rest of the company, and for the flattening of managerial structures above the foremen 
and increasing the skill of operators below them. He also feared the impact of increased efficiency on 
staffing levels, particularly in the steel plant where the inefficiency of the iron plant generated extra 
work. Finally, there was no discussion about how workers would benefit from increased profits:
‘This means more profits. Now, how do you benefit from these profits? By up^ading two 
people and employing two extra foremen? Until we are involved in how the profits are 
distributed, I don’t think we should cooperate with management -  although they like to see 
us cooperating.’
As important, if not more so, were his concerns about the politics of workplace change. As described 
earlier in this chapter, management did not see the restructuring committee as a forum for discussing 
and negotiating proposals, but expected shopstewards to endorse and help implement management 
ideas. It was important for the union ‘to counter them in many ways so that they can begin to respect 
us’ and so compel them to accept that change had to be negotiated. Workplace change was as much 
about the balance of power and control as it was about grading or efficiency. This applied to Bowker’s 
proposals as well, since he showed no inclination to negotiate with NUMSA shopstewards.
Fortunately for the union, many of the white foremen, worried about their own skills and ability and 
the extra responsibility and workload, were as concerned about Bowker’s proposals as Nhlapo. 
Concerned also about the pressure to implement the company’s new disciplinary procedure, they 
turned towards the one organisation able to resist management and joined NUMSA (see chapter 15). 
This gave the union the leverage to block Bowker’s ability to implement his proposals. This was 
likely to be only a temporary stalemate, however, because the white foremen were hardly likely to 
become an agent for democratic counter-initiatives to those of management, as NUMSA’s analysis of 
their role in the workplace regime made clear.
Meanwhile. Bowker was busy building other constituencies for change in the iron plant, b>'passing the 
shopsteward leadership who were ‘frustrating’ him. He cultivated cordial relations with national and 
regional officials, and let shopstewards know he discussed problems with them. He also devoted time 
to eliciting ‘wildcat cooperation’ from workers in various sections of the plant, letting them too know 
about his contacts with union officials. By the end of 1995. Nhlapo had to acknowledge that Bowker 
‘has managed to get me out of his way’. The group of energetic new black foremen appointed by 
Bowker supported the new way of working, and the while foremen had caved in. The foremen were 
shifted to the new way of working as a trial f^oject. The hot-charge car drivers supported Bowker s 
restructuring plans because it meant increased wages and responsibility for them. Nhlapo ’doubted 
whether the iron plant shopstewards were still really union representatives, since they too had been 
won over to Bowker’s idea. Nhlapo’s absence from the factory on the NTB project based in 
Johannesburg had given Bowker crucial space;
'I t’s also a question of capacity -  if 1 was in the factory, Bowker could not have moved an 
inch. He had all these plans a long time ago, but he was blocked. We said we need to have 
an agreement before he can implement them. Now if I come in there I’ll come in as someone 
who’s going to block progressiveness from Bowker. We’re divided in iroii plant. Most 
blacks want this thing in place, most whites are saying no to this thing.'
White workers did not provide a global constituency for the union. Besides the fact that they were a 
minority, they were primarily motivated by a fear of change and a desire U> maintain the status quo. 
Furthermore, they didn’t ‘have this culture of debating things to their final conclusion’, coming to a 
^  decision and taking action. By mobilising the desire of black workers for change. Bowker had woo
their support and undermined the ability of the shopsteward leadership to intervene. In the next 
section we shall e.xplore the way in which this 'wildcat cooperation’ was constructed.
‘Wildcat cooperation' in the iron plant
This section describes how Bowker was able to construct support for his vision of restruauring the 
work of kiln operators, furnace operators, hot-charge car drivers and shopstewards in iron plant one 
by encouraging participation and accommodating immediate concerns.
The kiln operators complained that as while kiln operators were replaced by blacks, management had 
done away with the kiln attendants. This meant the operators had to perform extra tasks, like 
cleaning their workplaces or unblocking the chutes that fed the kilns, which made it impossible to 
control the kilns properly and resulted poor production. Frustrated by management’s lack of 
response, a shopsteward on the kilns proposed in a meeting with management that they working 
group should be established to investigate the problem and propose solutions. A shopsteward from 
the furnaces added tliat they had a similar problem with a shortage of operators. The shopstewards 
and Bowker agreed that two working groups should be established, one for the kilns and one for the 
furnaces. The kiln working group consisted of the shopsteward, seven rank-and-file workers, the 
superintendent and assistant manager, and the furnace group had a similar structure. The 
shopstewards saw these working groups as participative structures where managers and workers 
should work together as a team, rather than negotiating as representatives.
According to the kiln shopsteward:
‘It was an idea that flashed into my mind -  that if we continue to put the whole problem on 
management they will do nothing We better get ourselves involved. There is no win, no
lose, in actual fact. When we arc disputing on a certain issue we are trying to find a solution, 
we are not trying to win. What are you going to win there? We all win if the solution is 
found, we all lose if there is no solution, because the problem will still be there.’
Although he regarded the working group pays as union structures, the shopsteward did not feel it 
necessary to discuss this initiative with the rest of the shopsteward committee beyond the iron plant:
'We have support for this throughout iron plant, but the other divisions don't know anything 
about it, because this involves the problems of iron plant. It's just a working group, we have 
agreed with management'
The shopsteward in the furnace working group agreed that the participatory forum should transcend 
the usual bargaining relationship between managers and unionists, but found that the manager was 
unable to do this:
I found something which is not right. If we are talking about a group that means we are a 
team. Bui the manager who was chairing the meeting was separating himself from us, from 
the team. He was talking on behalf of management, which means that we’re supposed to talk 
on behalf of the workforce, which is wrong. I told him that we re supposed to forget that you 
are a manager and 1 am a shopsteward. I’m not coming to represent someone here, we’re 
coming to try and solve the problems of these people, all of us, as a team. But he didn’t 
understand and nor did the other workers in the group who knew nothing about negotiating. 
They just accepted what he said. He wants to change our demand, to drive us in his election. 
We should follow him instead of sharing ideas. If he really wants to drive us. I’m going to 
crush this working group and we can go back to square one, to negotiating with 
management. ’
These two quotes show how 'w ildcat cooperation’ can emerge out of workers’ desire for a different 
relationship with management, a desire for management to cooperate with them. In the process, the 
potential for new definitions of collective identity are present, workers and even shopslewards may 
start to distance themselves from the union as the representative of the general interest of all w orkers 
in the company, and constitute into smaller, more local groups with specific work-interests -  iron 
plant workers, or kiln and furnace workers.
Bowker clearly succeeded in sorting out the problems on the furnace working group: a year later the 
shopsteward reported that the working groups had developed a successful proposal to solve the 
shortage of labour by employing and training a new category of workers called swingmen to operate 
kilns, furnaces and hot-charge cars. The sw ingmen formed a fle.sible, multi-skill group of workers 
who could be deployed wherever there were shortages -  to the kilns, furnaces for hol-chargc cars.
0Twelve extra workers were employed and trained for this position. The furnace shopsteward counted 
this as a success: new jobs had been created, the workload of operators had improved, and 
management and workers had cooperated fruitfully. The only problem was that the new multi-skilled 
workers were graded and paid two levels below the operators, although (hey were even more skilled. 
The shopsteward did not see this as a major problem: shifting identityagain he and other 
shopstewards had 'as the union’ demanded that this anomaly be addressed. Management had 
satisfied them by promising that it would be once the restructuring of work in iron plant as a whole 
had been completed -  again, successfully establishing a constituency in support of Bowker’s 
programme of restructuring
While the fiimace shopsteward was pleased with the success of the working groups, one of the white 
foremen who had joined NUMSA argued that management had pulled the wool over the workers’ 
eyes. The swingmcn were happy because they had been upgraded, but their presence was allowing 
management to continue reducing the number of other workers, some of them paid more highly than 
the swingmen: kiln and furnace operators, furnace attendants, hot-charge car drivers and radial gate 
attendants Swingmen had applied for vacant positions as kiln or fiimace operators, but were refused 
and the posts were kept vacant. Contractors were being brought in to do work previously done by 
fiimace attendance. Management was plaiming a programme of automation that would do away with 
hot-charge car drivers. Management was, in other words, slowly implementing a programme to 
create a smaller, multi-skilled and flexible workforce which would simultaneously reduce costs and 
increase responsibility. The iron plant shopstewards, focused on immediate and local concerns and 
grievances, were missing the broader picture and failing to proUxt the collective interests of all iron 
plant workers. Bowker had successfully mobilised localised interests in 'wildcat cooperation’ and 
undermined the union as the representative of the broader collective interest of workers.
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This tendency was exacerbated by the new opportunities for talented black workers -  and especially 
shopstew ards with leadership skills -  to benefit from upward mobility in the restmeturing process. 
The kiln shopsteward was promoted into the ranks of management and shifted to a different plant. 
The furnace shopsteward -  who had started out as a shopsteward on the tapping floor -  was regularly 
appointed an 'acting foreman’, and clearly expected to be promoted as a full-time foreman. 
Cooperation with management clearly held potential to athance their personal careers as well.
The fiimace shopsteward commented on the dangers of Bowker’s style:
'He is a good guy. He changed many things at iron plant. Before he came we worked very 
hard as shopstewards to show management the way. But Bowker us what is the main 
problem of the people, because iron plant was very militant. So we explained to him, and he 
said OK, I will try to assist you. So even the shopstewards are trying to assist him. He’s 
clev er. If you talk with him you’re supposed to be very careful. He tries to pull you from
your side to be with him now. to be on the management side. If you don’t look carefully, you 
can't see him pulling you from that side. He wants to use you. He knows that if he gives a 
report together with you to the workers, they are going to accept that. Maybe later they will 
recover and say this thing was not right. They are going to fight with you, not with him.
But a year later, he was convinced that fundamental changes had taken place:
‘Racism is totally changing. It really is. The management and workers are friends. If the 
foreman makes tea he doesn’t make tea for himself only. He ask all of us whether we want 
tea. Before, the foremen did not talk with the tapper. Now they talk not only about work, 
but generally. The whites are coming to NUMSA. And they even come to my place to visit 
me, these whites. Before, by was the enemy to them.’
This also meant the role of the shopsteward had changed:
‘There are no more disciplinary enquiries. The foremen can solve problems with the 
workers. For the past ten months nothing has been required of me as a shopsteward. Before, 
it was good with the apartheid system -  negotiation were very easy. We said, because we are 
black we want 25% across-the-board. Now you can’t tell the management, 1 want this 
because I’m black. No, you’re supposed to think now. The time for fighting is past. Now 
you can negotiate. The door is open. If there is something you are not happy about you can 
go and talk about it. ’
In the view of this shopsteward, a new workplace regime had been constructed through cooperation 
between workers, shopstewards and management. In the view of the shopsteward leadership, and in 
particular the chair of the steelworks committee. Leslie Nhlapo, through the process of ‘wildcat 
cooperation’ management in the iron plant had managed to undermine the collective identity of the 
union at Highveld Steel, co-opting the shopstewards and, through participation, building a 
constituency supportive of work restructuring among workers. The resull was management control 
over restructuring, which held potential dangers for workers, and the inability of the union to contest, 
negotiate or put forward its own demands in relation to restructuring Workplace restructuring was 
removed from the terrain of company-level negotiations where safeguards could be built in, long-term 
goals established, and the distribution of increased profitability negotiated
At an earlier phase of work restruemring in the iron plant -  a phase dominated by wildcat actions 
such as the two-day stayaway for elections -  Nhlapo had expressed confidence that management 
would be unable to proceed on the basis of ‘wildcat cooperation’ because that in turn generated 
wildcat opposition. Management needed the institutional relations with workers established b> the 
trade union.
0‘The iron plan! is one of (he few places where the green areas are being implemenled, to such 
an extent that you can no longer make a distinction between a shopsteward and a green area 
croup. There is no role for shopslewards at iron plant now. Management is confronted 
many people coming to them with complaints and complaints. People can group themselves 
from the green area and approach management if they want linking. That is exactly what we 
told management, that if you don’t clearly define the role of the shopsteward you will have 
problems. Now they want the union to go back and tell our members that they must do 
everything through the union structures, through (he shopsteward. But workers are no 
longer going to agree. I understand there are about 14 workers at iron plant now who 
negotiate on behalf of the workers, so obviously the union has got no rule there now.’
This meant management had to deal with 'undisciplined people’ who would not follow negotiating 
procedures or the disciplinary code, who at any moment can come to you and demand an increase 
and threaten to strike’. Management would have no recourse to the union, because they would be 
negotiating with workers, not union representatives. It was preferable, therefore, from a management 
point of view, to maintain strong unions structures.
However, developments in the iron plant suggested that Nhlapo’s confidence that management needed 
the union was misplaced -  particularly in a context where the leading shopslewards were not 
consistently available to either managers or workers. In the iron plant, management lost patience 
with the union and instead cultivated 'wildcat cooperation’. This became the basis for transition from 
the apartheid workplace regime to a new hegemonic regime under managerial domination.
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Assessing the NUMSA strategy
Negotiating a model agreement"*
By mid-1995 there seemed to be little prospect for cooperative agreement between management and 
unions at Highveid Steel. The three working ^ou|% had been shut down, and management opened 
the House Agreement negotiations withdrawing its commitment to implementing a five-grade 
system. However, management surprised NUMSA by proposing a new ‘Agreement of intent' to 
govern restructuring in the company. This sought to overcome the conflict and paralysis in the 
working groups in two ways. Firstly, it proposed that, ‘in view of the uncertainties, the lack of trust 
and inadequate benchmarking’, management and unions should jointly decide on a pilot project in a 
specific plant and focus their energies on this. The limited scope of such a project could reduce the 
fears of both management and shopslewards. Secondly, the project would be overseen by a joint
management-union steering committee This implied institutionalising a high degree of union 
influence, which management hoped would persuade the union to drop its strategy of resistance.
The shopstewards perceived this as a promising offer, and proceeded to develop proposals to amend 
the document 'to suit our own thinking and make it possible for us to achieve our goals’. The two key 
elauses finally accepted by the company effectively gave the union a veto over change in the 
workplace by stating that 'no other change would be implemented with regard to work reorganisation 
without reference to the joint management / union steering committee' and adopted the principles of 
co-determination - 'the full and equal participation' of the unions in 'the conception, development and 
implementation of any changes, and the sharing of information pertaining to this programme'. These 
were the clauses where shopstewards felt 'we are going to get our leverage to deal with management'. 
The final agreement also implied that the steering committee was not only to oversee the pilot project, 
but to identify projects and oversee change generally at Highveld Steel. The shopstewards rejected a 
clause which implied restructuring would necessarily lead to surplus labour. They fought for a 
commitment to a safer workplace, and after five meetings secured a promise to 'endeavour' for this 
goal They insisted on a reference to the inefficiencies of management through the recognition that 
not only demarcations and work practices, but also 'the levels of supervision' should be 'scrutinised'.
More broadly, the agreement committed the company and the union to making Highveld Steel 'the 
best manufacture of our products in the business' through increased efficiency, lower costs, increased 
qualify and a reduction of waste. This would provide the justification for more investment. Broad 
points were made about changing attitudes and working together 'at beating the competition' The 
document proposed changing work practices, removing artificial demarcations and increasing 
flexibility, investing in training and rewarding skill.
The agreement appeared to hold the promise of a new beginning, in which unions and management 
could negotiate a transition to a new workplace order acceptable to them both. However, profound 
disjunctures undermined this promise There was still no substantial shared ground on how the 
workplace should change or what the goals should be. The shopstewards had fought to include 
clauses that pointed in the direction of their vision -  but this did not mean that management 
understood or accepted the implications of such clauses.
Furthermore, despite the protracted negotiations and the signing of the agreement, senior 
management was still not committed to cooperation. The problem was that other options were being 
to emerge -  options that seemed more attractive because they promised to secure managerial control 
and sideline the union by cultivating 'wildcat cooperation’. Bowker's project in iron plant one was 
the most advanced and coherent of these. Thus management continued to pursue such projects, and 
even initiated a major new project at Vantra, without involving the unions, afler the agreement had 
been negotiated. Here the Highveld Steel management planned that Vantra workers and managers
would elect their own steering committee, modeled on the workplace forums proposed by the new 
LRA. The Vantra shopstewards would be included as a minority in this forum, which would not be 
accountable to the steering committee established by the Agreement of intent.
The agreement therefore got off to a bad start, exaceibated by attempts on the part of management to 
dilute the powers of the steering committee. . When the hill steering committee finally met, Nhlapo 
observed that. Things are just as they used to be - management is supposed to make the decisions and 
we must accept them.' Management 'sort o f agreed to put plant-level changes on hold until the 
steering committee was able to meet with managers and shopstewards in the relevant plants.
How can this anomaly be explained? The same senior managers who had negotiated the agreement 
were undermining it. In the view of the shopstewards, even the MD and the human resources 
manager who had negotiated the agreement were profoundly ambivalent about it. On the one hand, 
they knew that 'the rules of the game have changed now' and accepted that they had to cooperate with 
the union. On the other hand, they were still unable to grasp what this really meant, so 'it is a shift, 
but a shift that is on paper'. It had been made clear to some of the shopstewards that even the 
executive committee of the company did not fully support the 'paradigm shift'; and managers down 
the line 'are going to block everything we try to come up with', as the human resources manager had 
confessed. The majority of managers from top to bottom of the company were seemingly unable to 
transcend their history as creators and creatures of the apartheid workplace regime.
Clearly the shopstewards would face a lough battle to ensure that the agreement actually had any 
meaning in the workplace. The problem was that the union itself lacked the capacity to take up this 
battle. In the first place, the Highveld Steel shopstewards were operating completely on their own 
without any support from regional or head office officials - as the negotiations over the agreement of 
intent had shown'’ - and had effectively been doing so for about two years. They found that union 
policies were too broad and generalised to help them in implementing workplace strategies and 
engaging with management, and were forced to improvise. The handful of shopstewards who had the 
confidence and skill to do this was growing ever smaller. The key strategist and driver of the 
shopsteward committee, Leslie Nhlapo, was increasingly involved in union work at a national level; 
from early 1996 he was seconded full-time to work on a National Training Board (NTB) project in 
Johannesburg and was able to spend very little lime at Highveld Steel. Other shopstewards were 
increasingly Involved in political careers, as described in chapter 10, or positioning themselves for 
promotion within the company.
A shopstewards committee workshop held at the end of I99S to assess their strategic positio 
emphasised this issue. Discussion centred on successful efforts of management in iron plant one and 
GMPD -  with the newer threat of the Vantra project -  and on formulating strategies to gain control 
over ‘wildcat cooperation', re-establish the leadership of the shopstewards and union structures in the
affected plants, and steer restructuring under the control of the steering committee to be set up by the 
new agreement.
But the steady attrition of skilled shopstewards promised to render this a Sisyphean task. Once again, 
union resistance had won a major concession which it lacked the capacity to make efiective use of 
The agreement was unable to breach the divided perspectives produced the apartheid workplace 
regime, and it was effectively a dead letter.
Assessing the NUMSA strategy
The experience of the shopstewards at Highveld Steel suggests that there were two fatal flaws in the 
NUMSA strategy -  it overestimated the willingness of management to cooperate with the union, and 
it underestimated the kind of union capacity required to implement the strategy.
Management did not at any point demonstrate an understanding of what it might mean to negotiate a 
new workplace order and cooperate with NUMSA. There were moments in the engagement between 
the two where they were able to reach formal agreement on a process of negotiated cooperation -  but 
management's behavior suggested an inability to comprehend what this might mean in practice.
Management's inability to cooperate with the union was linked to its location in the apartheid 
workplace regime. Management did not appear to recognise the crisis of the regime, it’s deep 
illegitimacy in the eyes of workers, it's burden of racist, authoritarian, ineflicient and incompetent 
managers, and its structural inequalities. As the creators and creatures of this order, they could not 
see how apartheid had structure workplace institutions, culture, practices and relations, or that this 
legacy needed transformation. As a result, they did not formulate a comprehensive strategy, but 
implemented a series of ad hoc and often ill-conceived measures. It is clear that they recognised 
inefliciency as a problem, but prepared to deal with this without acknowledging a role for the union -  
first through attempted to impose cooperation and discipline, and then through cultivating 'wildcat 
cooperation’. Management’s own lack of capacity was also significant; the only manager who stands 
out as having a clear grasp of the issues at stake, and a clear strategy for dealing with them was 
Bowker.
The question of race and class arises out of the attempt to understand these weaknesses. Were the 
managers of Highveld Steel acting primarily as whites who could not contemplate a serious sharing of 
power with blacks, or were they acting simply as capitalists, who generally avoid cooperating with 
union and resist union incursions into their rights' and prorogatives’? The behavior of the Higliveld 
Steel managers might be recognisable and endorsed by capitalist managers eveiywhere. On the other
hand, few are faced with such a legitimacy crisis, such divided workplaces or such inefiicient labour 
processes.
The lack of union capacity has been discussed at several points in this chapter. It is clear that when it 
embarked on the path of strategic unionism, NUMSA underestimated its complexity and the kinds of 
skills and resources it would required This was especially so in the context of national liberation, 
which generated a wave of upward mobility among trade unionists. These weaknesses meant that, at 
a certain point, shopslewards lost faith in the strategy and even in the union. Nhlapo articulated this 
at the end of 1995 -  the union could continue to paralyse management initiatives, but had no 
alternative initiatives of its own:
The first step is to make sure that within Vantra nothing happens. You block that thing, use 
your old tactics, call strike action, make sure that a similar thing does not happen in GMPD. 
Then force them to implement the agreement by form the steering committee. Then once 
youVe done that, I don't know what the steering committee is going to do. That is how far I 
can think about this thing - block Vantra, block GMPD, then establish a steering committee - 
don't ask me then what. That's precisely the problem, because from here - what?'
The union had no guidelines for how to participate in green areas, how to form teams without being 
'divided by capitalist ideas', how to negotiate production bonuses for profrt-sharing. While 
management was building on experience, engaging at the NTB, learning from other companies both 
in South Africa and abroad and developing their strategies, the handful of union officials who were 
familiar with union thinking on these issues were leaving NUMSA and COSATU. The result was that 
the shopstewards could not move from shaping the process of engagement with management to 
shaping the content:
'How do I counter his argument? Do I have something concrete that 1 can put on the table? 
No. We said as the union that training is the key to workers' advancement • but we are not 
equipped to deal with these issues. We don't have people that are committed to these things.
1 hat's why I say we're a bit lost'
The next chapter explores the impact of ‘strategic unionism’ on the social structure of the union.
There was a third problem area in the union struggle -  that of the impact of increased efficiency on 
working life and job loss. Generally the shopstewards argued that increased efficiency was 
compatible with -  and depenckd on -  increased training and skills, better pay and increased job 
control, but at times expressed anxiety about the dangers of losing jobs and of greatly increased 
workloads. They frequently acknowledged that there was a great surplus of labour at Highveld Steel, 
and that restructuring would lead to redundancy. This was easier U> fight in opposition to
management -  but how would the union be able to deal with it if it was cooperating with management 
to improve efficiency? What would this mean for the credibility of the union, or its ability to 
represent its members? This issue never had to be confronted in practice, because management 
rejected cooperation.
The future of the apartheid workplace regime
Chapter 11 argued that the contrast between political liberation and the persistence of the apartheid 
workplace regime, and the disjunction between them, generated a further decomposition of the 
workplace regime. This affected discipline, supervisory authority and work performance. The failure 
of the union strategy to transform the workplace, and the general failure of managerial strategies to 
recompose the workplace regime, meant that the core features of the apartheid workplace regime -  
including its decomposition -  remained in place. Two incidents illustrate this point: a conversation 
between Leslie Nhlapo and his workmates, and the re-emergence of industrial action against racial 
assault in 1996.
‘I went into the mess-room 15 minutes before tea-time, only to find artisans and labourers already 
there -  not washing their hands, but eating already. I said to them. I'm working on a project that 
workers must be more effective, they must lake charge of the production process. But here you are 
eating! What's going on? They said. We've voted Mandela into power, and unless we see serious 
changes we’re not going to change the way we operate, we're going to continue as we ate continuing 
now. I said, we need to motivate that you guys work hard. They said. No. we can work hard if they 
give us money. Why are the whiles getting more money?’”
While the above conversation illustrates the persistence of racial alienation and resistance to work 
discipline among black workers, the racial assault case illustrates both this and the persistence of 
apartheid practices among managers and supervisors.
In September 1996 a black labourer went to the shop to buy bread for tea?' On his return he was 
confronted by his white charge-hand for being absent from were without permission, and was 
assaulted by him. He lodged a grievance. A disciplinary inquiry was held and both workers were 
dismissed for assault. Both were reinstated on appeal with final warnings. Some 2000 NUMSA 
members at the steelworks launched an immediate illegal strike, demanding the dismissal of the w hite 
supenisor and the reinstatement of the labourer with a clear record. The strike lasted 12 days. The 
strikers ignored a supreme court interdict to ordering that they return to work. After a week the 
company and NUMSA reached agreement that the dispute should be referred to an arbitrator, but 
could not agree to the union's demand that, should the arbitrator find that the workers were correct
and that the company had failed to apply its disciplinary procedure fairly, its members should be paid 
for their time on strike. After several more days stoppage, the company agreed to this demand.
o
The aibitrator found that on the labourer’s return from the shop the charge-hand grabbed him and 
began to force him towards his offtce. The labourer was Justified in resisting this assault by 
attempting to push the charge-hand away, whereupon the charge-hand hit the labourer on his cheek 
with his fist hard enough for a doctor to record bruising and laceration. The white charge-hand was 
therefore guilty of assault and the labourer not guilty. The arbitrator did however comment that the 
labourer’s attitude to work and supervision was ‘reprehensible’. He was frequently absent ftom his 
workplace without permission and his attitude 'indicated an arrogant disregard of his duties as an 
employee’
This case read like a carbon copy of the confrontations of the 1980s, arul repeats the panems of the 
1993 strike against racial assault discussed in chapter 11 -  minus the militant involvement of the 
MWU and the AWB. Clearly important elements of the apartheid workplace regime were still present 
in 1996, six years after the unbanning of the liberation movement and more than two years after the 
democratic elections. The case suggests that not only was racial assault still a bctor on the 
shopfloor, and not only that managers continued to support white supervisors against black workers 
and apply discipline in a racially discriminatory way, but that despite a professed concern about the 
high incidence of assault on the shopfloor, the senior management of the company were prepared to 
support white managers without question through a costly 12 day strike. The persistence of racial 
tension on the shopfloor seems to have been invisible to senior white managers, and in a newspaper 
advertisement the company blamed the union for behaviour which was discouraging investors and 
very damaging to the entire national effort’. It is difficult to imagine how a ’national effort’ could be 
built on the foundations of apartheid workplace which the company was implicitly defending.
o
The persistence of the apartheid workplace regime -  or at least of core elements of it -  ensured the 
continued illegitimacy of the workplace regime in the eyes of workers. This is implicit in the 
workplace behavior of the black worker -  which recalls Nhlapo conversation with his workmates -  
and their strike behavior. The strikers ignored the dispute provisions of the new LRA -  newly 
enaaed by the democratic government -  as well as the court interdict. The company complained that 
the union showed ‘disregard for agreed procedures’ and 'for the law’, and that workers ’barricaded 
roads, manhandled and threatened employees going to work, hijacked contractors’ vehicles and 
damaged a number of vehicles’. As Nhlapo had commented earlier, when provoked workers would 
pul aside any agreement or procedure in order u> ‘deal directly with management’. The cost to the 
company -  and the national economy - is high, both directly through the strike which was estimated 
to have cost the company R30 million, and through ongoing inefficiencies.
The diversity of experiences at Highveld Steel discussed in this chapter makes it difficult to predict 
the future of the workplace regime, at Highveld Steel or in industry more broadly. The evidence 
suggests rather that the transition from the apartheid workplace regime is a complex, slow and 
contested one, and that several different outcomes are possible. The nature of a new, 'post-apartheid' 
regime will be defined by struggles in workplaces across South Africa, by contestations at industrial 
and national levels, and by (contested) interventions by the state as well. While a particular kind of 
workplace regime may come to dominate nationally, there are likely to be a wide range of variations 
in different workplaces, depending on labour process, union and management, regional dynamics, etc.
It is possible to discern three different possible outcomes on the basis of the Highveld Steel evidence.
/. A neo-aparlheid workplace regime.
The workplace changes through a series of ad hoc, partial reforms, some negotiated and some 
imposed. There is a connection shift in the racial division of labour and the racial structure of power, 
but the legacy of incompetent, authoritarian management, high levels of inequality, and a low skill, 
low productivity workplace continued to define workplace culture and practices. Relations between 
unions and management remain antagonistic Managerial hegemony is only partially established; 
workers form a strong defensive and resistant block, the workplace order is characterised a partial 
legitimacy and the legacy of the decomposition of the apartheid workplace order continues to affect 
discipline and workers commitment to work.
2. Lean production and managerial hegemony.
Management succeeds in marginalising the unions and reconstituting workplace relations under 
managerial hegemony. This takes the form of wildcat cooperation' where the labour process is 
relatively complex and workers are relatively skilled and exercise a degree of control over their work, 
as at Highveld Steel. Where the labour process is relatively simple -  simple assembly work for 
example ~ management may be able to construct a more authoritarian workplace order. The 
workplace rapidly becomes relatively non-racial, with a high emphasis placed on training and black 
advancement -  indeed, the rapid and widespread promotion of black managers and workers 
characterises this regime. The unions are seriously weakened.
3. A democratic workplace regime:
This regime is distinguished by strong, proactive trade unionism and management cooperation with 
the unions. This is a source for a comprehensive programme for the transformation of the workplace 
regime. The workplace is increasingly characterised by higher levels of skill, improved efficiency and
iiuiovation. Managerial weaknesses may be compensated for by union and worker involvement, 
f^nions are strong and there is a significant level of worker control of production and the sliornoor.
i Highveld Steel evidence suggests tliat the third workplace regime is highly unlikely, although 
much of government’s legislation and intervention is directed towards encouraging it. Managerial 
resistance and union weaknesses mean that a neo-apartheid or lean production workplace regime are 
far more likely to emerge fiom workplace and industrial contestations and become the prevalent 
workplace regime. Again, the lack of capacity both of management and of labour suggest that the 
first is more likely than the second; perhaps a mixture of these two regimes is probable, with islands 
of lean pioduction based on managerial hegemony in a sea of conflictual and inefficient neo-apartheid 
workplaces.
' This section is based primarily on Leslie Nhlapo (2), 50-8, 60-3, 70; also Bunny Mahlangu (2), 9- 
10; Ambrose Mthembu (2), 31-4; Ezekiel Nkosi (1), 44-7; (2), 9-10; Jacob Skhosana (2), 3-7.
 ^ This section is based on Fietdnotes: Highveld Steel shopstewards meeting, 19 May 1994;
Fieldnotes: Highveld Steel shopstewards meeting, 12 November 1994; Fieldnotes: Highveld Steel 
shopstewards meeting, 9 December 1995; Fieldnotes 11/4/95; 7/6/95; 18/7/95; Ambrose Mthembu 
(4), 1-3; Leslie Nhlapo (4), 8, 31-2, 37-8; (5), 15-29; (6), 33-4; Highveld Steel lelter, 29 April 1994: 
Appendix C: Technical negotiating structures.
 ^ 1 am referring here to the lack of a common underlying understanding on these issues; there was a 
formal agreement according to which each technical committee would meet at least once per 
fortnight, decision-making would be by consensus, agreements and disagreements would be referred 
to a steering committee, and unresolved issues would be referred to mediation or arbitration.
* The following account of the green areas and TQM initiatives is drawn from Ambrose Mthembu (1), 
29-32, 34, Leslie Nhlapo (2), 39-44; (3 b), 1-9; (4), 13-16; (5), 23-4; Ezekiel Nkosi (1), 59-64; (3), 1- 
2; (4), 5-7; (5), 24; Johannes Phatlana (1), 25-6; Tshagata (2), 3-4. The account of the disciplinary 
initiative is drawn from Fieldnotes; Highveld Steel joint shopstewards committee meeting 12 
November 1994; Koos Fouche, 25-30, Ambrose Mthembu (4), 12-13; Leslie Nhlapo (3), 17; (5), 13- 
15; (6), 66-9; Hendrik Nkosi (3), 22-3; Johannes Phatlana (3), 16-18.
’ This paragraph is based on Ambrose Mthembu (I), 28-9; (4), 11; Leslie Nhlapo (2), 29; (4), 5-6 
‘ This paragraph is based on Ambrose Mthembu (1), 33-4; (4), lO-l I ; Ezekiel Nkosi (2), 34.
’ This paragraph is based on Ambrose Mthembu (1), 15-16, 34-5; Leslie Nhlapo (2), 29-31; Johannes 
Phatlana (3), 20-2.
* This section is based on Ambrose Mthembu (2), 1-5, 16-23; (3), 21-7.
’ Leslie Nhlapo (4), 10-11; Fieldnotes, 9/6/94.
Johannes Phatlana (3), 23-4.
" The account of the changes in flat products is based on Philip Mkatshwa (2), 4-7, 16-17; Ezekiel 
Nkosi (5 tape 2), 27-9; Sidwel Nkosi, 6-9.
This account of events at Rand Carbide is based on Leslie Nhlapo (4), 7-9; JJ Mbonani (2), 18-21, 
25-6; Fieldnotes: Highveld Steel shopstewards committee meeting, 19 May 1994; Fieldnotes 9 6/94 
and 9/6/94 (2).
Leslie Nhlapo (2). 10.
The next two paragraphs are based on Leslie Nhlapo (2), 10-13, Ezekiel Nkosi (1), 47-8; (3), 16- 
17
This account of the struggle to construct a new order on the tapping floor draws from Albert 
Makagula (1), 1-9, 22-4; (2), 6-8; Leslie Nhlapo (2), 13-27, (3), 15; (3 b), 12; Hendrik Nkosi (1), 1- 
25; Veli Majola 6-9, 13-14.
“  Since Highveld Steel was a continuous-process plant, workers attended work on public holidays 
but were paid overtime rates.
”  This and the next section are drawn from Koos Fouche (part one), 1-13, (part two), 4-5; Paxon 
Mokoena, 21, 32-39,43; Leslie Nhlapo (3b), 14; (4), 3-5, 7, 22-3; (5), 15-18, 27-8; (6), 48-51; 
Hendrik Nkosi (2), 9-12, 15, 19, (3), 1-7, 12-13, 25, Daan van Nickerk, 6-8; Fieldnotes: conversation 
with Mike Bowker, iron plant manager, 24/3 ^94.
'* This section is based on Fieldnoies: Highveld Steel shopstewards meeting, 9 December I995\ 
Fieldnotes 16/2/9&, Ambrose M lh e n ^  (4), 3-9; Leslie Nhlapo (6), 30-5, 36-46, 59-62; Ezekiel Nkosi 
(5). 12-14, 23-4, 246; Approach to multi-skilling: NUMS4 (prepared by shopstewards in March 
1995; Agreement o f  intent: efficiency improvement programme (draft 6 July 1995 and final draft with 
Structures and procedures, 9 September 1995; Workplace changes (shopstewards' response to July 
draft of above, n.d., handwritten; Into the bushes (document prepared by shopstewards in early 1997 
for bosberaad with management).
When the shopstewards had finished negotiating the agreement, the national organiser and 
regional organiser responsible for Highveld Steel refused to sign on behalf of NUMS A, citing the 
clause on redundancies as unacceptable. The shopstewards were scathing in their response, pointing 
out that the organisers had failed to attend negotiations, that the clause stipulated consultation on 
retrenchment and that in any case the House Agreement laid down procedures for negotiating 
retrenchment, and arguing that their agreement was far superior to what the national union had 
achieved in the industrial council. Eventually NUMSA did sign.
”  Leslie Nhlapo (6), 57-8.
This account is based on the arbitrator’s award (faxed mimeo, reference no GAR 001597);
Business Day F IF  96, 5/1F96. 12/11/ 96; The Star 7/1F 96; Highveld Steel ‘Cautionary 
announcement’, advertisement in Business Day 13/11/ 96; NUMSA advertisement in Business Day 
13/12 96.

